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Abstract 
Crediting in the banking sector plays an important role in all developed and developing 
countries.   For this reason, it is monitored continuously by public authorities and measures 
are taken to control credit supply in economic growth periods. On the other hand, in an 
economic slowdown, when banks are reluctant to increase their credit portfolio, public credit 
guarantee programs are put into use to increase the credit supply.  
 In this study, a sample covering 26 advanced and emerging economies was analyzed, and 
the effects of credit gap, credit guarantees and economic growth on credits and arising credit 
risks were investigated. The findings show that both credits and non-performing loans, an 
important measure of credit risk, are affected by credit gap, credit guarantees, and economic 
growth. On the one hand, public credit guarantees positively affect economic growth. On the 
other hand, though they are widely used for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, 
our findings suggest that such expansive credit policies might negatively affect the riskiness 
of the credit portfolios and soundness of the banking sector.  
Keywords: credit expansion, credit gap, systemic risk, credit guarantees, procyclicality. 
 
Introduction 
Credits make an essential contribution to the development of national economies. 
Excessive credit expansion, similar to inadequate credits, also has the potential to 
harm economic activity. Therefore, the credit amount provided by banks and credit 
institutions, proper administration of the credits, and good management of non-
performing loans within the framework of laws and regulations of the country are 
assessed as a whole and are monitored closely by the public authorities. The 
soundness of the banking and financial system are strictly related to the correct 
management of this cycle under country conditions. 
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It is expected that the banking system will grow within its dynamics and due to the 
country's economic conditions. However, from time to time, the growth figures may 
differ from their long-term values. The emerging trend naturally draws the attention 
of authorities, and the question of whether overgrowth is healthy is to be researched. 
The IMF's 2004 World Economic Outlook Report indicates that excessive credit 
expansion in developing countries is as high as 75% related to the financial crisis. 
In the growth period of the economy, while banks are increasing their loans rapidly, 
their balance sheets grow. When the economy enters a period of contraction, the 
credits are undergoing a sharp contraction. As a result, the decrease in the supply of 
credit during the downturn, as well as the excessive credit expansion, which is 
observed during periods of economic growth, act as a kind of accelerator, enhancing 
the economic cycle. 
The findings of many empirical studies also support these determinations. Borio and 
Lowe (2002), Frömmel (2006), Riiser (2005 and 2008), Rheinberger & Summer 
(2008), Gerdermeier (2009), Misina & Tkacz (2009), Llaudes et al. (2010) have 
empirically shown that bank lending is effective in interacting with various financial 
assets on the procyclical instability of the financial system. On the other hand, Davis 
& Dilruba (2008), Repullo et al. (2009), Jokivuolle et al. (2009), Gruss & Sgherri 
(2009) have determined that procyclical movements of asset prices cause significant 
problems in the credit risk estimation process. These findings suggest that the 
procyclicality of asset prices is a key component of the mechanism between 
excessive credit expansion and the instability of the financial system. 
Measures to prevent excessive credit expansion within the scope of countercyclical 
measures have been put in place together with the Basel III framework after the 
2008-2009 global crisis.  On the other hand, the loans granted by banks and financial 
institutions have shrunk rapidly during the last global financial crisis. In this case, 
authorities have supported the increase in credit supply through credit guarantee 
programs (OECD, 2010, 2012, 2013; World Bank, 2013).  
Our study, in the light of these findings and assessments, is intended empirically to 
analyze the risks and fragilities that may be caused by excessive credit increases 
induced by credit guarantee programs. The main question to be answered in the study 
is whether such a process has the potential to evolve into a financial crisis, and if so, 
how high the risk would be.  
The study has been divided into two main parts except for the introduction and 
conclusion. The first part consists of the theoretical framework of credit expansions, 
credit guarantee programs as countercyclical financial measures and risks arising. 
The second main chapter is devoted to econometric analysis and findings. 
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Theoretical Background 
2008-2009 global financial crisis renewed interest in the causes and consequences 
of excessive credit expansion in the economy. Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger 
(2000) have put forward over-optimism as a significant factor for credit expansion.  
Kindleberger (2000) also mentions "herding behavior" by banks, mainly agency 
problems that lead to the implementation of lending policies by some banks that may 
be affected by others. Gorton & Ordonez˜ (2014) informs that credit booms typically 
precede a financial crisis and credit growth is the best indicator of the likelihood of 
a financial crisis. Gourinches (2001) states that the greater the credit growth, the 
higher the probability of a crisis. Dell Aricca & Marquez (2006) emphasize that 
banks have lowered their lending standards during periods of rapid credit growth, 
which in turn worsened the credit portfolio and the banking system became 
vulnerable to financial pressure as downside risks to the economy arise. Jorda, 
Schullick & Taylor (2011), Davis, Mack, Phoa & Vandenabeele (2016) suggest that 
excessive credit expansion is the best indicator of the financial crisis and that this 
relationship is strengthened when it is combined with the increasing current account 
deficit. In a similar study; Schularick & Taylor (2012) have argued that successive 
economic instability is caused by a bad credit expansion period. They argue that the 
main reason for this is probably the result of the financial system's operational 
management and its regulatory failures. Levine (2005) states that credit can rapidly 
grow mainly in financial deepening, in normal upswings and excessive cyclical 
fluctuations. Elekdag & Wu (2013), show that balance sheets of banks and 
companies deteriorate during an excessive credit expansion, overheating in the 
economy takes place together with large capital flows, the current account deficit 
increases, asset price shows an upward trend, and domestic demand is strong.  
 
Determination of Excessive Credit Expansion 
The determination of credit expansion is usually done statistically or with 
econometric models. In the statistical method Mendoza & Terrones (2008, 2012), 
Gouriches (2001), Barajas, Dell'Ariccia & Levchenko (2007), Tornell & 
Westermanm (2002), IMF(2011); Dell'Ariccia et al., (2016), Arena et al., (2015) 
compare country's Credit to GDP ratio or real credit to per capita ratio by using the 
positive deviations from the trend when deviations pass a certain threshold. In these 
studies, there are differences in credit variables and threshold selection in 
determining excessive credit expansion. 
Apart from statistical methods, in some studies, econometric methods are used to 
determine the long-term equilibrium level of credit or credit growth as a function of 
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economic fundamentals in all selected countries. Then the periods of excessive credit 
expansion for all selected countries as points above the long-run equilibrium levels 
are determined (Boissay, Collard & Smets, 2006; Cottarelli, Dell'Ariccia, & 
Vladkova-Hollar, 2005; Égert, Backé & Zumer, 2007; Kiss, Nagy & Vonnák, 2006; 
Hansen & Sulla, 2013). 
 
What is Systemic Risk? 
IMF, FSB, and BIS (2009) define systemic risk in their work for the G20 as " risk of 
disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the 
financial system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
real economy." BIS (2010: 2) informs that financial services include credit 
intermediation, risk management and payment services. It also states that the lack of 
a clear definition of systemic risk is due to time, economy, special circumstances, as 
well as lack of knowledge about the behavior of the financial system,  its interaction 
with the economy and its sensitivity to policy interventions. Tunay (2014) states that 
systemic risk in banking reflects the interaction between the negative performance 
of institutions in general terms. 
 
The Definition of Procyclicality 
Crediting is one of the main factors which supports the procyclical behavior of 
banks. While the economy starts to grow, and interest rates go down, the investment 
projects begin to become feasible for banks. Consequently, credit stock in the 
banking sector starts to increase. 
Procyclicality generally refers to mechanisms of a mutually reinforcing mechanism. 
It strengthens the dynamics in business fluctuations (BIS, 2008). This positive 
feedback mechanism is destructive and more visible, especially at times when the 
economy or financial system is under stress. In such a period, financial institutions 
incur losses, their capital bases deteriorate, and borrowing terms worsen in the 
market. They are forced to cut credits and sell assets in their portfolio, which in turn 
weakens the economy. As a result, reducing the financial strength of the financial 
institutions increases their default or bankruptcy risks.  
 
Procyclicality and the Bank Balance Sheets 
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It would also be useful to consider the effect of the procyclicality on bank balance 
sheets. In a financial system, assets are constantly marked-to-market, which means 
that changes in prices are immediately reflected in the balance sheets.Net value of 
all the financial intermediaries in the financial system are effected continuously. 
Especially the equity capital of banks is vulnerable to changes when the balance 
sheets are highly leveraged. The financial intermediaries actively adjust their 
balance. In other words, during periods of economic growth, the use of leverage is 
increased, and during periods of contraction, it is reduced. "Leverage is in fact, 
procyclical which can be seen as a consequence of the active management of 
balance sheets by financial intermediaries who respond to changes in prices and 
measured risk" (Adrian & Shin,2010). 
 
Countercyclical Financial Regulations 
The global financial crisis has led to the focus on procyclicality within the macro-
prudential framework. Finance, and especially the nature of banking activities, 
inherently increase the impact of business cycles and are procyclical. 
The macroprudential framework is concerned with systemic risks both in the time 
dimension (procyclicality) and in cross-cutting dimensions (concentration and 
interdependence). During periods of growth, credit expansion improves ahead of 
economic growth. In periods of economic recession, the creditworthiness of the 
borrowers - as a result of reduced corporate profits- will decline, household income 
and wealth will go down. Worsening collateral values, increasing risk perception 
and tightening lending standards will make lending more difficult. It leads to 
worsening economic expectations. There are two main objectives of countercyclical 
financial regulations: to increase the flexibility of the financial system in the event 
of a possible downturn in the future, to lean against the wind in the cycle, to prevent 
excessive credit expansion and to prevent the accumulation of imbalances in an 
upswing (Haocong, 2011). After the 2008 financial crisis, public credit guarantee 
programs have been used as a countercyclical financial tool.   
 
Public Guarantee Programs 
It is known that the first public guarantee program was founded in Holland in 1915, 
but most government-run guarantee programs were established in the 1990s 2000s 
(Pombo & Herrero, 2003). Public guarantee programs first began to be used in the 
1950s, and they were used in 70 different countries in various forms until the early 
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2000s. Governments often used these programs for companies which had not been 
not adequately credited by private-sector financial intermediaries, for small and 
medium-sized firms, newly established companies and for innovative firms that 
developed new products. Lately, public guarantee programs gained more importance 
for both developed and developing countries and were widely used. After the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, Public Guarantee Programs in Canada, Chile, Finland, 
Germany, and South Korea were started to be used widely in response to the decrease 
in loans of private banks. Many countries rapidly strengthened their guarantee 
programs with the total amount of funds available, the number of companies eligible 
for funding, the percentage of a loan guaranteed and/or size of the guaranteed loans. 
During the financial crisis, countercyclical use of credit guarantee programs has led 
to the expansion of both the scale and scope of the programs (Gozzi & Schmukler 
2016). The European Commission, for example, has made decisions to facilitate the 
financial access of companies operating in the European Union countries through 
publicly funded guarantees and credit support. As a general method; the maximum 
credit guarantee amount has been increased. In 2008, the guarantee given by the 
public in France was 50-60%.  This rate was later raised to 90% in France, and 75% 
in the UK. 
Public guarantee schemes vary significantly in terms of the guaranteed loan amount. 
For example, some of the largest are located in Asia.  In 2013 the guarantee system 
in Japan, with a total of 3.1 million guarantees, about 305 billion US dollars and a 
guaranteed new loan of about 713,000, was the largest of the programs. The second-
largest program was conducted in South Korea. The 2013 stock guarantee amounted 
to 400,000, and the total size reached 40 billion USD, in other words, about 4% of 
South Korea's GNP. When other guarantee programs are looked into, it is generally 
seen that the size is less than 100,000, and two-thirds of them guarantee a credit 
below 1,000 per annum. (Beck, Klapper & Mendoza, 2010). 
In terms of both economic theory and empirical findings, the effects of these 
programs on the volume of economic activity due to the financing of firms are not 
very clear (Gozzi &Schmukler, 2016; D'Ignazio & Menon, 2013). In developed 
countries, it is seen that if the credit guarantee programs are designed and managed 
correctly, public resources will not be wasted, productivity, innovation, growth, 
employment, and exports will increase. Sweden is a good example of such programs 
(Cowling, 2017). 
Chatzouz et al. (2017), in the aftermath of the Global Crisis, stated that credit 
guarantee programs in Western Europe made significant contributions to increase 
the volume of economic activity by extending their activities. However, despite this 
response to the crisis, it was determined that the credit demands of the small and 
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medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were insufficient, and this limited the use of credit 
guarantees. It shows that credit guarantee programs have positive real economic 
impacts that depend on the credit demands of firms. 
The effects of credit guarantee programs are also under discussion in emerging 
economies. Zhang & Ye (2010), for example, examined the results obtained after 
running a credit guarantee program for ten years in small and medium enterprises in 
China. They have determined that the effectiveness of the guarantee program has 
decreased for many reasons, such as risk-sharing and increased collateral. Zhang and 
Ye (2010) point out that to increase the efficiency of the program, both the 
development of a fund-raising mechanism and indemnity mechanism should be 
improved, and appropriate conditions should be established for the companies to 
develop new products and services. 
The results of Liang et al. (2017) research on the effectiveness of the credit guarantee 
program implemented in South Korea are also stimulating in this regard. Their 
findings show that banks' cost-effectiveness decreased when loans extended to small 
and medium-sized firms. 
This decline is caused by information asymmetry. However, they stated that the 
credit guarantee programs could increase the cost-effectiveness of banks and that the 
guarantee system should share the risk of banks reasonably. In other words, when 
the state and banks reasonably share the risk, the system becomes effective, and the 
efficiency decreases significantly when the share is against the banks. 
Researchers like Cowling (2017), Gozzi & Schmukler (2016) state that the success 
and financial sustainability of the guarantee programs depend on an accurate design. 
Cowling (2017) argues that the use of guarantee programs as a policy tool should 
determine whether the main objective is economic, socioeconomic or regional 
development. It stresses the importance of considering the possible effects of 
different parameters in the design of credit guarantee programs and the determination 
of their possible limits for the program to operate smoothly. Chatzouz et al., (2017), 
researchers such as Gozzi and Schmukler (2016) found that the limitations of the 
programs as well as the design mistakes, the slow processing of the bureaucracy, and 
the guarantees required are the crucial factors that reduce the success of the credit 
guarantee programs. In a study carried out by the Asian Development Bank (2016), 
the importance of sectoral targeting was emphasized, and it was stated that studies 
should be carried out on the collateral plans, monitoring and cancellation processes 
to be applied in case of default for the supported companies. 
On the other hand, such programs have some handicaps for banks. While playing a 
role as a capital increase for banks, difficulties in practice due to the complexity of 
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the regulations, the lack of transparency, etc.  have reduced the level of success 
(Chatzouz et al., 2017). It has been determined that credit guarantee programs change 
the risk allocation, but do not eliminate the default risk, and if the correct pricing is 
not performed, the price will reflect both the probability of default risk and the risk 
will be transferred to the debtor (Asian Development Bank, 2016). 
 
Econometric Analysis 
Analysis Method and Structure of the Models  
Cross-section dimensions of many panel data sets may be bigger compared to their 
time dimensions. In this case, the generalized least squares estimator can produce 
effective results. In this context, linear panel data models (such as fixed or random-
effects models) or generalized linear models which estimate the mean of the 
population (panel logit, probit, etc.) may be used. However; feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) estimator is a more effective method of estimation in the case 
that there is a cross-sectional correlation, first degree autoregressive (AR(1)) 
correlation coefficient within the cross-sections or in that heteroskedasticity exists 
in the sample in which cross-sectional correlation may not present. (Sanchez, 2012; 
Wooldridge, 2010: 298-299).  As will be explained in the next sub-section, the 
method in question was preferred as an analysis tool since the number of cross-
sections of the data set to be used in our study exceeds the number of observations 
per cross-section. 
The general structure of a linear panel data model can be shown as follows: 
 it it ity X  = +   (1) 
In the equation numbered (1) i = 1,…., m indicates the number of units or cross-
sections (panel), t = 1,…,Ti indicates the number of observations in cross-section i. 
yit symbolizes the dependent variable and Xit symbolizes the independent variables 
vector. it are the error terms assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and 
2 variances. The general structure of the variance matrix of error terms is as follows 
(StataCorp, 2013: 159): 
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 
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 (2) 
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Variances of cross-sections (panels) in many panel data sets are different from one 
another. For example, this situation shall be observed when the branches or 
representative offices of a big company spread in a broad geographical area covering 
several countries, several provinces within a country in different settlement places. 
In this case, the diagonal of the matrix numbered (2) shall be defined with variances 
special to the cross-section (StataCorp, 2013,p.159; Sanchez, 2012, p. 42): 
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Error terms may be correlated in certain samplings. Furthermore, they may have 
variances with different scales as well. In this case, the structure of the variance 
matrix shall become more complex (StataCorp, 2013, p. 160): 
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If the model is to be estimated considering the cross-sectional correlation, the cross-
sections to be analyzed should have a balanced structure. The structure of the 
variance matrix is defined more generally in the models with auto-regression, and its 
diagonal is composed of unit matrices. Since the cross-section correlations in data 
sets with a short time dimension are almost equal, the use of a general auto-
regression parameter in limitation of the model shall be the most accurate selection. 
The feasible generalized least squares estimator can be defined as follows (Cameron 
& Miller, 2015, StataCorp, 2013, p. 163): 
 ( )
1
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
GEK X X X y
−
− − =    (3) 
 ( ) ( )
1
1ˆ ˆ
GEKVar X X
−
−=   (4) 
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Variance matrix () is the Kronecker product of the unit matrix where covariance 
matrices of residuals (i,j) and dimensions are equal to the number of observations 
per cross-section (StataCorp, 2013, p. 163): 
 
i im m T T
I =   (5) 
The covariance matrix of the residuals in the equation numbered (5) is calculated as 
follows, and it is used in the calculation of standard errors of coefficient estimations 
and t and/or z tests as well (taking the reciprocal) (Wooldridge, 2010: 298; 
StataCorp, 2013, p. 164): 
,
ˆ ˆ
ˆ i j
i j
T
 
 =  
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimations of the models can be made as well based on 
the feasible generalized least squares estimator. For this purpose, FGLS estimation 
is repeated by being updated in each step until autoregression of the residuals does 
not remain.  
In this study, the channels through which bank credits (Crd) opened for the private 
sector and non-performing loans (Crdnonperf.) are affected by systemic risk, and by the 
public guarantees given to the bank credits shall be researched. BIS recommended 
the credit-to-GDP gap ratio as systemic risk criterion in the recent period for the 
banking authorities of the countries included in Basel Consensus. Within this 
framework, the credit-to-GDP gap and public guaranteed bank credits have been 
included in the model as the primary explanatory variables. 
Golemi (2015), Antunes et al. (2018), Alessi & Detken (2018) emphasize the 
importance of the credit gap as a leading indicator reflecting bank crises in recent 
experimental studies. Golemi (2015), Alessi and Detken (2018) stated that 
unsustainable credit developments lead to the accumulation of systemic risks in 
terms of financial stability. In this regard, Antunes et al. (2018), Alessi & Detken 
(2018) have developed alternative early warning models. In addition to some other 
variables, the credit gap was included in both models.  
Credit-to-GDP gap (CrdGap) is calculated as the deviation of the proportion of the 
bank credits opened for the private sector to GDP from its own long term equilibrium 
values. And the credit guarantees (CrdGuar) have been calculated considering the 
public guarantees given to the bank credits opened for small and medium-sized 
enterprises for the countries in the sample. The details of the calculation are 
explained in the next sub-section. 
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Credits and the credit risk they are exposed to are strongly affected by the 
fluctuations in the economic activity volume. Many empirical studies suggesting the 
accuracy of this judgment are available in the relevant literature. In this respect, 
economic growth has been included in the model as a control variable in addition to 
the aforementioned variables. In this manner, it shall be possible to observe in the 
sample examined how the bank credits opened for the private sector, and non-
performing bank credits have been affected by economic growth. The model which 
makes up the basis for the analyses has been presented as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3
Gap Guar
it it it it ity Crd Crd Grw    = + + + +  (6) 
 , nonperity f Crd Crd=  
In equation (6); yit is the dependent variable and symbolizes the credits in the first 
model analyzed and non-performing credits in the second one. i(i=0,…,3) 
symbolizes the estimated parameters vector and it symbolizes the error terms the 
features of which are defined previously. 
 
Data Set 
A data set covering 26 developed countries and significant emerging economies has 
been used in the study. The countries in the sample have been presented in Appendix 
Table 1. The panel data set prepared contains the annual date of the period of 2007-
2014 and has a balanced panel structure. The total number of observations is 832. 
The definitions of the variables in the model numbered (6), which make up the basis 
for estimations and data sources have been given in Table 1, and definitive statistics 
have been given in Table 2. 
Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition  Source of Data 
Crd Credits:  
The Ratio of Bank credits granted for Private Sector 
to GDP  
World Bank Global 
Financial Development 
Database, 2017 
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KrdNonperf. Non-performing Credits: 
The ratio of non-performing bank credits to total 
credits 
World Bank Global 
Financial Development 
Database, 2017 
Grwth Growth:  
Growth rate calculated from GDP series measured 
by constant prices. 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Database, 
October 2017. 
CrdGap Credit-to-GDP gap:  
The ratio of bank credits granted to the private sector 
to   GDP and deviation from its long-term trend 1 
Bank for International 
Settlements / BIS 
August 2017 period 
statistics. 
CrdGuar Credit guarantees: 
Public guarantees were given to bank credits of 
small and medium-sized enterprises2 
OECD Scoreboard: 
Financing SMEs and 
Entrepreneurs 2016, s. 
72. 
(1) This variable is measured by its deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott trend. It has 
been calculated by BIS. 
(2)  Natural logarithms of the data compiled in the national currency of the relevant 
country have been taken. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Observation Average Std.Deviation Min. Max. 
Crd  208 90.870 53.214 16.560 272.600 
CrdNonperf.  208 4.387 4.636 0.200 33.780 
CrdGap  208 0.00000192 5.501 -25.166 20.188 
CrdGuar  208 2.522 1.518 -0.00437 5.574 
Grwth.  208 1.433 3.606 -14.724 11.113 
Correlations of the variables with one another have been presented in Table 4. 
Examining the correlation coefficients, it is observed that credits and non-performing 
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credits have strong interactions with the credit-to-GDP gap, credit guarantees, and 
growth. 
Table 3  
Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
  Crd. Crd.Nonperf.  CrdGap CrdGuar Growth 
Crd  1.0000     
CrdNonperf.  -0.0766 1.0000    
CrdGap  0.1090 0.0739 1.0000   
CrdGuar  -0.1979 0.1121 0.0414 1.0000  
Grwth.  -0.2163 -0.3079 -0.4218 -0.0709 1.0000 
 
Findings 
Since the panel data set we used consisted of developed and emerging economies 
and each had different structural features, it has been assumed that cross-sections 
exhibited heteroscedasticity and error terms had autocorrelation peculiar to the cross-
section.  
In order autocorrelation of error terms to be eliminated and to make the estimation 
more effectively, the maximum likelihood (ML) method has been used. The results 
of estimation have been presented in Table 4. 
 Examining the results, it is observed that the coefficient significance of both models 
was extremely high, and the model passed the Wald test indicating general 
significance. In the estimation results of the first model, it is observed that the 
proportion of bank credits opened for the private sector to GDP was affected 
positively by all variables in the model.  Because of the strong relationship between 
economic growth and bank loans, it is natural that there is a strong relationship 
between the credit gap used as a systemic risk criterion and the fluctuations in the 
volume of economic activity. 
The banks make more credits available in expansion periods of the economy and 
credits increase above their long term equilibrium values. On the other hand, total 
credit volume shall narrow in an economic slowdown since the banks behave 
involuntarily in opening new credits and this time credits will decrease below their 
long term trend. Undoubtedly, the provision of a guarantee by the state for the credits 
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opened by the banks for small and medium-sized enterprises shall incite SME credits 
of banks and lead to an increase in total credits. Consequently, it is a natural result 
that credit guarantee programs positively affect the bank credits opened for the 
private sector.   
However, this positive effect cannot always be achieved. Regardless of the level of 
development of the country in which the program is implemented, the expected 
results may not be obtained due to a lack of sufficient demand for credit guarantees, 
incorrect design of the program or incorrect selection period. For example, the study 
of D'Ignazio & Menon (2013) on Italy showed that the credit guarantee program 
applied did not have an impact on total credit volume, although it led to an increase 
in long-term loans and a decrease in loan rates. More importantly, there was no 
significant increase in the volume of real economic activity as a result of this 
program. 
Table 4  
UGEK –Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results of the Model Numbered (6) 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variable Crd  Crd
Nonperf. 
Crd Coefficient z Test 
 p 
Value  Coefficient z Test 
p     
Value 
CrdNonperf 1.07216 184.680 0.000  0.02355 2.560 0.011 
CrdGap 0.22640 3.140 0.002  0.20246 2.840 0.005 
CrdGuar 0.02091 3.040 0.002  -0.04911 -3.370 0.001 
Grwth 74.79837 287.190 0.000  2.56576 11.530 0.000 
Wald Tests:        
Ki Square: 60960.86    39.710   
p -Value: 0.0000    0.000   
 
The estimation results of the second model indicate that the proportion of non-
performing bank credits to GDP, the dependent variable was positively affected by 
the variables except for growth. It is reasonable to expect to have significant defaults 
in credit repayments in shrinkage periods of economies. The companies the sales 
volumes of which decrease, and which have difficulty in collection of their 
receivables may delay payments of their credit obligations or may even completely 
become insolvent. The severity of such developments depends on the duration as 
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well as penetration of recession. On the other hand, defaults in credits may be 
observed more in the credits of companies operating in specific sectors since certain 
sectors, including tourism, construction, and so on, tend to be affected more 
negatively by recession periods than other sectors together with food and 
transportation.  
Non-performing bank credits are a significant indicator of credit risk. In this respect, 
the fact that this has a positive relationship with the credit gap should be taken 
normally. The more credit-to-GDP gap increases, the more systemic risk shall rise, 
and default risk for the credits shall increase in direct proportion accordingly. 
However, the relation of credit guarantees with non-performing credits should be 
assessed more carefully. Credit guarantees are a measure sought by the state to 
subsidize certain sectors in regular periods and to invigorate the economy in periods 
of recession.  
Since credit repayments are not much interrupted when the economy grows or 
continues, generally, credit risk shall naturally be low. However, in periods of 
recession, particularly if the economy is in a deep and comprehensive stopover 
period; credit guarantees have the potential of increasing the risk for bank credits. 
According to the estimation results, credit guarantees having a positive effect on non-
performing credits indicate the significance of this potential.  
These findings indicate that the credits increase in the case the state gives a guarantee 
for bank credits in addition to economic expansion periods. Consequently, following 
policies as credit guarantees in shrinkage periods may expand total credit volume 
and play a role in the shortening of the period of recession. Additionally, the 
existence of a serious systemic risk element should be taken into consideration since 
the credits exhibit a strong procyclicality. The structures and features of the sectors 
for which credits shall be allocated by the banks should be taken into consideration 
in determining the applicable guarantees. The credits opened for the companies 
operating in certain sensitive sectors may have serious default risk. For this reason, 
credit riskiness of the banks may increase, and significant systemic fragilities may 
arise. 
 
Result 
A sample covering 26 developed countries and significant emerging economies has 
been analyzed in the study, and the effects of the credit-to-GDP gap, credit 
guarantees and economic growth on credits and credit risk have been researched. 
Since the number of cross-sections of the sample analyzed is quite higher than the 
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number of observations per cross-section, the feasible generalized least squares 
estimator rather than linear panel data techniques, including fixed and random 
effects, was preferred. This estimator gives more successful results in samples with 
a low number of observations per cross-section. Furthermore, factors including 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation on the cross-section basis were taken into 
account considering the different structural features of the countries included in the 
analysis. 
The findings obtained indicate that non-performing credits, significant criteria of 
both credits and credit risk, are strongly affected by credit gap, credit guarantees, and 
growth. Credits are affected by all those variables positively. It was observed that 
banks expand credit supply in growth periods, and the proportion of credits to GDP 
rise over its own long- term equilibrium values. It is an expected result because it is 
known from the findings of international empirical studies that credits are a variable 
strongly influenced by the changes in economic activity. Estimation results have 
indicated that the effect of economic growth on non-performing credits was negative. 
This result supports the procyclicality of the credits. Credit volume increases, and 
default proportions decrease in periods of expansion of economies. On the other 
hand, in an economic downturn, both credits shrink, and non-performing credits 
increase. Despite this, the credit gap affects non-performing credits positively. Rises 
in credit gap generally stem from excessive credit increase and may be effective in 
the increase of non-performing credits. 
Estimation results also indicate that the public credit guarantees increase total credit 
volume as well. One may say that this effect is independent of the general course of 
the economy. Namely, credit guarantees may be used as a means of expansive policy 
in periods of a slowdown in the economy. However, it has also been observed that 
non-performing credits namely risks of credits of banks were affected by this 
variable positively. Public guarantees may lead banks to act less selectively while 
granting credits and cause an increase in their riskiness. On the other hand, the desire 
to increase credits through this channel in economic recession periods shall lead to a 
similar effect as well. In this context, crediting the sectors more vulnerable to the 
effects of recessions has a high- risk potential although the financial structure of 
companies credited may be reasonably solid. The decrease in the turnovers of such 
companies and/or their failure to collect their receivables may cause them to become 
quickly insolvent. The findings suggest that policies for expanding credit stock may 
have positive effects as well as adverse effects. For this reason, potential results of 
practices, including credit guarantees, should be analyzed well by decision-makers.  
While concluding, it should be noted that the main contribution of the study is to 
investigate the effectiveness of credit guarantee programs and the risks that may be 
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caused by a comprehensive sample of developed and developing countries. 
However, due to the difficulties encountered in obtaining the data, the options for 
the methods to be used in the analysis are limited.  In the compiled data set, the fact 
that the number of cross-sections exceeds the number of observations per cross-
section constitutes the most important handicap of the study because it has prevented 
a more detailed econometric analysis.  
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Appendix 
Table 1  
Countries in Analysis. 
Austria Hungary 
Belgium Israel 
Canada Italy 
Chile Japan 
Colombia Mexico 
Czech Republic Republic of 
Slovakia 
Denmark Russia 
England Slovenia 
Estonia South Korea 
Finland Spain 
France Thailand 
Greece The USA 
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Holland Turkey 
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